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Scrape Timestamp (UTC): 2026-01-08 21:29:59.095
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VMware ESXi zero-days likely exploited a year before disclosure. Chinese-speaking threat actors used a compromised SonicWall VPN appliance to deliver a VMware ESXi exploit toolkit that seems to have been developed more than a year before the targeted vulnerabilities became publicly known. In attacks from December 2025 analyzed by Huntress, managed security company, the hackers used a sophisticated virtual machine (VM) escape that likely exploited three VMware vulnerabilities disclosed as zero-days in March 2025. Of the three bugs, only one received a critical severity score: At the time of the disclosure, Broadcom warned that the security issues could be chained by attackers with administrator privileges to escape the VM and gain access to the underlying hypervisor. However, a new report from Huntress provides clues indicating that vulnerabilities may have been chained into an exploit since at least February 2024. The researchers found in the PDB paths of exploit binaries a folder named "2024_02_19," suggesting that the package was developed as a potential zero-day exploit. Furthermore, from the name of the folder, which translates to "All/Full version escape - delivery," it could be inferred that the intended target was ESXi 8.0 Update 3. Huntress assesses that initial access likely came through a compromised SonicWall VPN. The attacker used a compromised Domain Admin account to pivot via RDP to domain controllers, stage data for exfiltration, and run an exploit chain that breaks out of a guest VM into the ESXi hypervisor. The exploit toolkit involved the following components: The researchers found more clues pointing to the build date of the toolkit. A PDB path embedded in the 'client.exe' binary has a folder named "2023_11_02." It is possible that the component was "part of a broader vmci_vm_escape toolkit with a getshell component." The researchers believe that the threat actor may have a modular approach, where they separate the post-exploitation tools from the exploits. This would allow them to use the same infrastructure and just switch to new vulnerabilities. Huntress told BleepingComputer that they are moderately confident that the exploit toolkit leverages the three vulnerabilities that Broadcom disclosed last March. Their assessment is based on the exploit's behavior, including the use of HGFS for information leak, VMCI for memory corruption, and shellcode escaping to the kernel. However, they could not confirm with 100% certainty that it's the same exploitation Broadcom disclosed in its original bulletin on the three zero-days. Regarding the exploitation timeline and attribution-related observations, Huntress reports that some build paths include simplified Chinese, but there's also an English-language README, possibly indicating an intention to sell it to or share it with other threat actors. Huntress comments that this combination likely suggests that the toolkit was developed by a well-resourced developer operating in a Chinese-speaking region. Although the researchers are highly confident that SonicWall VPN was the initial entry vector, they recommend that organizations apply the latest ESXi security updates and use the provided YARA and Sigma rules for early detection. 7 Security Best Practices for MCP As MCP (Model Context Protocol) becomes the standard for connecting LLMs to tools and data, security teams are moving fast to keep these new services safe. This free cheat sheet outlines 7 best practices you can start using today.
Daily Brief Summary
Chinese-speaking threat actors exploited VMware ESXi vulnerabilities over a year before their public disclosure, using a compromised SonicWall VPN for initial access.
The attackers leveraged a sophisticated virtual machine escape technique, exploiting three VMware vulnerabilities identified as zero-days in March 2025.
Evidence suggests the exploit toolkit was developed as early as February 2024, with a folder indicating the target was ESXi 8.0 Update 3.
The attack involved pivoting from a Domain Admin account to domain controllers, staging data for exfiltration, and executing an exploit chain to access the ESXi hypervisor.
Huntress researchers found PDB paths with simplified Chinese, hinting at a Chinese-speaking developer, and an English README, suggesting potential collaboration with other actors.
The toolkit's modular design allows for post-exploitation tools to be separated from the exploits, facilitating adaptation to new vulnerabilities.
Organizations are advised to apply the latest ESXi security updates and use YARA and Sigma rules for detection, as recommended by Huntress.