Article Details
Scrape Timestamp (UTC): 2026-02-03 20:32:37.564
Original Article Text
Click to Toggle View
Wave of Citrix NetScaler scans use thousands of residential proxies. A coordinated reconnaissance campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler infrastructure over the past week used tens of thousands of residential proxies to discover login panels. The activity was observed between January 28 and February 2, and it also focused on enumerating versions of the product, indicating an organized discovery effort. Threat monitoring platform GreyNoise traced the source of the scanning traffic to more than 63,000 distinct IPs that launched 111,834 sessions. According to the researchers, 79% of the traffic was aimed at Citrix Gateway honeypots. Roughly 64% of the traffic came from residential proxies, with IPs spread across the globe, appearing as legitimate consumer ISP addresses and bypassing reputation-based filtering. The remaining 36% came from a single Azure IP address. The activity strongly indicates pre-exploitation infrastructure mapping, rather than random internet scanning, GreyNoise says. "The specific targeting of the EPA [Endpoint Analysis] setup file path suggests interest in version-specific exploit development or vulnerability validation against known Citrix ADC weaknesses." The two indicators of malicious intent are obvious, with the most active one generating 109,942 sessions from 63,189 unique IPs and targeting the authentication interface at ‘/logon/LogonPoint/index.html’ to identify exposed Citrix login panels at scale. The second indicator, observed on February 1st, was a six-hour sprint with 10 IPs launching 1,892 sessions focused on the URL path ‘/epa/scripts/win/nsepa_setup.exe’ to enumerate Citrix versions via EPA artifacts. GreyNoise notes that the attacker employed a user agent for Chrome 50, released in early 2016. Targeting the EPA setup file may indicate an "interest in version-specific exploit development or vulnerability validation against known Citrix ADC weaknesses." “The rapid onset and completion suggest a targeted scanning sprint that may have been triggered by discovery of vulnerable EPA configurations or intelligence about deployment windows,” GreyNoise says. The most recent critical-severity flaws impacting Citrix products are CVE-2025-5777, aka ‘CitrixBleed 2,’ and CVE-2025-5775, a remote code execution vulnerability that was exploited as a zero-day. GreyNoise lists several detection opportunities for this latest activity, including: Additionally, the researchers recommend that system administrators review the necessity of internet-facing Citrix Gateways, restrict access to the /epa/scripts/ directory, disable version disclosure in HTTP responses, and monitor for anomalous access from residential ISPs in unexpected regions. GreyNoise has also shared the IP addresses used to launch the scanning activity. The future of IT infrastructure is here Modern IT infrastructure moves faster than manual workflows can handle. In this new Tines guide, learn how your team can reduce hidden manual delays, improve reliability through automated response, and build and scale intelligent workflows on top of tools you already use.
Daily Brief Summary
A coordinated scanning campaign targeted Citrix NetScaler infrastructure, utilizing over 63,000 IPs to identify login panels and product versions, suggesting organized reconnaissance efforts.
GreyNoise detected 111,834 scanning sessions, with 79% targeting Citrix Gateway honeypots, indicating potential pre-exploitation mapping rather than random scanning.
Approximately 64% of the scanning traffic originated from residential proxies, bypassing reputation filters by appearing as legitimate consumer ISP addresses.
The campaign focused on the EPA setup file path, hinting at interest in developing version-specific exploits or validating vulnerabilities against Citrix ADC weaknesses.
Two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-5777 and CVE-2025-5775, pose significant risks, with the latter being exploited as a zero-day.
GreyNoise recommends reviewing the necessity of internet-facing Citrix Gateways, restricting access to specific directories, and monitoring for unusual access patterns.
System administrators are advised to disable version disclosures in HTTP responses and consider the shared IP addresses for improved detection and response.